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The old equitable remedy of ex parte temporary relief has been resur-
rected recently in federal law. Although known to English law since the
twelfth century,' temporary relief without notice has enjoyed only periodic
acceptance in America. For nearly a century after the federal courts were
created, ex parte injunctions were prohibited by statute.2 More recently,
their use was disfavored under procedural due process.3 During the last sev-
eral years, however, the owners of intellectual property rights have redis-
covered ex parte orders and, with the approval of many federal courts, have
developed a formidable weapon to be used against infringers and
counterfeiters.
Misappropriators, infringers, pirates, and smugglers have made millions
of dollars by the unauthorized use of valuable intellectual property rights
such as trademarks, copyrights, patents, and trade secrets. The increasing
caseload of federal courts has created delays which may outlast the brief
lifespan of advanced technological products, such as software and video
games. The problem is further compounded by the ease with which some
infringing merchandise can be hidden or destroyed. For example, suitcases
which contain millions of dollars in counterfeit jewelry or integrated circuits
can be removed from a court's jurisdiction in a matter of hours. Bootleg T-
shirts and other promotional products can be inconspicuously sold by anony-
mous vendors shortly before rock concerts and football games.4 Valuable
and highly sensitive trade secrets can be disclosed by an unfaithful employee
to a competitor in mere minutes.
The losses attributed to product counterfeiting, passing off, and copy-
right and patent infringement have reached dramatic levels. During 1982
alone, domestic industries lost an estimated six to eight billion dollars in sales
from unauthorized use of their intellectual property rights.5 The practice is
as widespread as it is lucrative. Products are counterfeited in forty-three
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countries, particularly in the Far East, for unauthorized sale in sixty-seven
countries, including the United States.6  Over 150 different products are
counterfeited, including computer hardware and software, jewelry, luggage,
and handbags.
7
Conventional requests for temporary injunctive relief require that no-
tice be served on the defendants. Although the concept of notice is deeply
ingrained in American notions of fundamental legal fairness, in the area of
infringement of intellectual property rights, notice merely warns counterfeit-
ers of impending legal action and hastens the concealment of infringing mer-
chandise.8 As a result, the plaintiff is left without a remedy. Efforts to
protect intellectual property are frustrated, defying the court's authority to
provide relief.
Long ago, the English chancery and American state courts realized that
swift, ex parte relief was justified when the defendants were likely to do seri-
ous mischief by destroying or concealing evidence.9 Federal courts, however,
have been slow to recognize the situations in which the plaintiff will be de-
prived of a remedy if the defendant is notified. Fortunately, the federal
courts in some circuits now appreciate the danger that serious mischief poses
to intellectual property rights. They have responded by resurrecting ex
parte temporary relief, such as injunctions and seizure orders under Rules
65(b)' 0 and 6411 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, as powerful legal
6. Id. at 361.
7. Id.
8. See In re Vuitton et Fils S.A., 606 F.2d 1, 5 (2d Cir. 1979).
9. See Shrewsbury & C. Ry. Co. v. Shrewsbury & B. Ry. Co., 1 SIM. N.S. 410,61 E.R. 159
(1851); 17 HALSBURY'S LAWS OF ENGLAND § 480 (1911).
10. Temporary Restraining Order; Notice; Hearing; Duration. A temporary re-
straining order may be granted without written or oral notice to the adverse party or
his attorney only if (1) it clearly appears from specific facts shown by affidavit or by
the verified complaint that immediate and irreparable injury, loss, or damage will
result to the applicant before the adverse party or his attorney can be heard in opposi-
tion, and (2) the applicant's attorney certifies to the court in writing the efforts, if any,
which have been made to give the notice and the reasons supporting his claim that
notice should not be required. Every temporary restraining order granted without
notice shall be indorsed with the date and hour of issuance; shall be filed forthwith in
the clerk's office and entered of record; shall define the injury and state why it is
irreparable and why the order was granted without notice; and shall expire by its
terms within such time after entry, not to exceed 10 days, as the court fixes, unless
within the time so fixed the order, for good cause shown, is extended for a like period
or unless the party against whom the order is directed consents that it may be ex-
tended for a longer period. The reasons for the extension shall be entered of record.
In case a temporary restraining order is granted without notice, the motion for a pre-
liminary injunction shall be set down for hearing at the earliest possible time and takes
precedence of all matters except older matters of the same character; and when the
motion comes on for hearing the party who obtained the temporary restraining order
shall proceed with the application for a preliminary injunction and, if he does not do
so, the court shall dissolve the temporary restraining order. On 2 days' notice to the
party who obtained the temporary restraining order without notice or on such shorter
notice to that party as the court may prescribe, the adverse party may appear and
move its dissolution or modification and in that event the court shall proceed to hear
and determine such motion as expeditiously as the ends of justice require.
FED. R. Civ. P. 65(b).
11. At the commencement of and during the course of an action, all remedies provid-
ing for seizure of person or property for the purpose of securing satisfaction of the
judgment ultimately to be entered in the action are available under the circumstances
and in the manner provided by the law of the state in which the district court is held,
existing at the time the remedy is sought, subject to the following qualifications:
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weapons to combat unfair profiteering. Although the current revival has
occurred in the field of intellectual property, the principles of ex parte tem-
porary relief have long been a part of general legal practice. Most of these
decisions are unreported because the wrongful action often ends at the pre-
liminary stages in district courts. Therefore, many lawyers and judges re-
main unfamiliar with the use of ex parte temporary relief. Unfortunately,
some federal districts cling to the past and refuse to grant ex parte temporary
relief despite accumulating precedent. These reluctant courts threaten to
fragment and confuse legal practice and to encourage both forum shopping
and illegal infringement of intellectual property rights.
The absence of reported case law and scholarly commentary on ex parte
temporary relief has created a need for a comprehensive examination of the
history and use of this ancient equitable remedy. This article will review the
historical development of ex parte relief, including its origin in England, its
abolition under early American federal law, its revival in the late nineteenth
century, and its long period of disuse in the twentieth century stemming
from nineteenth century abuses. This article will then examine the current
resurrection of ex parte temporary relief in trademark, trade secret, and
copyright disputes. Finally, it will discuss the various forms of temporary
relief available under Rules 64 and 65(b), including injunctions, inspections,
seizure and impoundment.
I. HISTORICAL DEVELOPMENT
A. English Chancery Praclt'ce
1. The Problem of Serious Mischief
It is not surprising that certain remedies which resemble modern inter-
locutory injunctions without notice have been known to the English legal
system since the earliest times. For example, in the twelfth century, Norman
kings regularly issued ex parte de recto writs to evict individuals who had
wrongfully usurped the property of rightful tenants.' 2 De recto t 3 writs were
issued at the request of one party and commanded the king's vassal simply to
do justice to the plaintiff. It was not until later that the writ praecipe in
capite t 4 gave the defendant an opportunity to dispute the king's order. t5
Centuries later, when the monarch's inherent judicial power had been
relegated to the courts, such injunctions were granted when the chancery
(1) any existing statute of the United States governs to the extent to which it is appli-
cable; (2) the action in which any of the foregoing remedies is used shall be com-
menced and prosecuted or, if removed from a state court, shall be prosecuted after
removal, pursuant to the rules. The remedies thus available include arrest, attach-
ment, garnishment, replevin, sequestration, and other corresponding or equivalent
remedies, however designated and regardless of whether by state procedure the rem-
edy is ancillary to an action or must be obtained by an independent action.
FED. R. Civ. P. 64.
12. F. MAITLAND, THE FORMS OF ACTION AT COMMON LAW, 20-24 (1909).
13. A writ of right, which lay to recover a person's full rights to property. BALLANTINE'S
LAw DICTIONARY 339 (3d ed. 1969).
14. A writ of right which lay when one of the king's immediate chief tenants had possession
usurped by another. BALLANTINE'S LAW DICTIONARY 972 (3d ed. 1969).
15. F. MAITLAND, supra note 12, at 23-24.
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was satisfied that the delay accompanying ordinary proceedings might entail
waste or "serious mischief."'
16
Other temporary injunctions were granted to prevent waste. A classic
example of this practice can be found in Vane v. Lord Barnard,17 in which
chancery issued an ex parte order enjoining the destruction of a castle. Lord
Barnard gave Raby Castle to his eldest son in tail male for a wedding gift.
Later, when Barnard was displeased with his son, he sent 200 workmen to
Raby Castle and stripped it of its furnishings, including windows, doors, and
floors. When Barnard failed to appear in court, his son obtained a tempo-
rary injunction, 18 which prevented Barnard from tearing down the castle.
Chancery later upheld this order to stay the commission of waste, and in fact
decreed that Lord Barnard repair the damage he had done.19
"Serious mischief" included taking advantage of the delay between a
hearing and the issuance of a decree to do the very act that was to be en-
joined. The English Chancery addressed this problem in the classic case of
Skip v. Harwood20 Skip and Harwood had been partners in the brewing
trade. Several years later, Harwood was on the brink of bankruptcy and had
not yet paid Skip his share of the partnership proceeds. Skip sued Harwood
and obtained a decree that Harwood should not dispose of any inventory
until the accounts could be settled. Even on the morning of entry of the
decree, Harwood proved himself a man not to be trusted, for he, "removed
no less than 250 butts of beer in a fraudulent collusive manner, in order to
evade the decree he expected would be made in the cause."' 2' Lord Hard-
wicke found Harwood guilty of contempt (and committed him "to the
Fleet"), even though Harwood acted before the decree was drawn up, be-
cause he knew of the pending injunction. Otherwise, Lord Hardwicke rea-
soned, "it would be extremely easy to elude decrees, some of which in their
nature require a considerable length of time before they can be completely
drawn up."22 Although the defendant had clear notice of the impending
injunction, the interlocutory punishment of Harwood clearly recognized the
harm to property rights caused by judicial delay and unscrupulous parties.
The reasoning of Skip v. Harwood is not reported in English law for an-
other one hundred years, but there is no reason to believe it fell out of judi-
cial favor. Nineteenth century cases relaxed the notice requirement to allow
simple notice by telegram, 23 granted ex parte injunctions at the beginning of
litigation and recognized the use of ex parte temporary orders to protect
intellectual property rights. 24 In Dalghish v. Jarvie,2 5 the plaintiff obtained an
16. 17 HALSBURY'S LAws OF ENGLAND § 592 (1911). The early English treatises of Pome-
roy, Bispham, Storey, and Ames provide little or no discussion on the source of the Chancery's
authority for granting temporary injunctions. Note, Ex Parte Injunctions, 1 BROOKLYN L. REV.,
101, 107 n.16 (1932).
17. 2 Vern. 738 (1716).
18. Id. at n.4.
19. Id.
20. 3 Atk. 564 (1747).
21. Id.
22. Id. at 565. -
23. In re Bryant, L.R. 4 Ch. Div. 98 (1876).
24. Dalghish v. Jarvie, 2 Mac. & G. 178, 20 L.J. Chanc. 475 (1850).
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ex parte injunction to prevent the defendant from selling textiles imprinted
with a copy of the plaintiff's copyrighted design. The High Court of Chan-
cery on review later dissolved the ex parte injunction, because it appeared
that the plaintiff had abandoned its copyright by publishing the design
before registration. 26 Lord Langdale believed that the plaintiff suppressed
the material fact of prior publication. Thus, disregarding the actual merits,
he dissolved the ex parte injunction. Lord Langdale emphasized, however,
that ex parte injunctive relief, regardless of inconvenience to the defendant,
would not be granted unless the facts indicate that it alone can provide the
injured party with a remedy.
27
2. Standards for Ex Parte Relief
The chancery was willing to issue ex parte injunctions in exceptional
situations, such as the threat of interference with or destruction of prop-
erty.28 This willingness was tempered by three considerations. First, the
court was unlikely to grant an ex parte injunction if the defendant's actions
would merely inconvenience or embarrass the plaintiff.29 The second con-
sideration is that the plaintiff must show a likelihood, rather than a mere
possibility, that the defendant will interfere with or destroy the property
prior to a decree.30 The third consideration was based on how promptly the
plaintiff sought ex parte relief. Because ex parte injunctions are extraordi-
nary remedies, the chancery carefully considered the time at which the
plaintiff first knew of the injury. If the plaintiff acquiesced for some time,
the chancery would not grant relief without notice to the opposing party.
31
25. Id.
26. Id. at 187.
27. Commissioner Langdale stated:
When a plaintiff comes for an injunction to restrain the defendant from the prosecu-
tion of his legal right, there are several things to be considered: not only is the amount
of the injury which may be done to be taken into account, but, also the extent to
which the decision at law upon the subject could go, and the degree of certainty, more
or less, in reference to that decision. Taking these several matters into consideration,
the Court will in some cases refuse to interfere at all, and in others refuse to interfere
otherwise than by postponing the question for a time, and giving the opportunity of
bringing an action in the mean while. But in certain other cases, where justice cannot be done
without it between the parties, the Court, notwithstanding the inconvenience, will grant the injunc-
tion in the ftrst instance, and will not leave the party to any other course ofproceeding to ascertain the
legal right. Which of these courses is the proper one to be followed must depend on all the circum-
stances of each particular case.
Id. (emphasis added). Lord Commissioner Rolfe concurred and stated:
[T]he application for a special injunction is very much governed by the same princi-
ples which govern insurances, matters which are said to require the utmost degree of
good faith, "uberrima fides." . . . . [I]f the party applying for a special injunction,
abstains from stating facts which the Court thinks are most material to enable it to
form itsjudmgnet, he disentitles himself to that relief which he asks the Court to grant.
Id.
28. Shrewsbury & C. Ry. Co., v. Shrewsbury & B. Ry. Co., I SiM. N.S. 410, 61 E.R. 159.
29. Id.
30. Hooper v. Broderick, 11 Sim. 47 (1840). In Hooper, the owner of an inn obtained an cx
parte order preventing his lessee from closing the inn or discontinuing its licenses. The inn was
losing money for the lessee, who operated it, and the owner believed that the lessee would
endanger its operating licenses. The court disolved the injunction, because plaintiff could not
show that the lessee intended to forfeit the licenses.
31. 17 HALSBURY'S LAWS OF ENGLAND § 592 n.l (1911).
1984]
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3. Modern English Practice
This tradition of granting ex parte relief in exceptional circumstances
continues in England today. In fact, English courts expanded the use of ex
parte relief to include inspection and seizure orders to protect intellectual
property rights. In Anton Piller KG v. Manufacturng Processes, Ltd,32 a West
German manufacturer of computer equipment sued its English agent for dis-
closing copyrighted designs to competitors. The manufacturer obtained an
ex parte order authorizing it to inspect the agent's premises and to seize
documents and other evidence. This order was not a search warrant, for
English courts have no power to issue search warrants. 33 Rather, the court
ordered the agent to permit entry. If the agent refuses, the manufacturer
cannot enter, but may inform the court of the refusal. Contempt charges
and other unfavorable inferences may thus arise at trial.
In affirming the issue of the Anton Piller order, Lord Denning, Master of
the Rolls, commented that:
(S)uch an order can be made by a judge ex parte, but it should
only be made where it is essential that the plaintiff should have
inspection so that justice can be done between the parties; and
when, if the defendant were forewarned, there is a grave danger
that vital evidence will be burnt or lost or hidden, or taken beyond
the jurisdiction, and so the ends of justice be defeated; and when
the inspection would do no real harm to the defendant or his
case. 
34
Ormrod, L.J., agreed with the decision, and elaborated that the issuance of
such an ex parte order should require: 1) an extremely strong prima facie
case; 2) serious damage to the plaintiff; 3) clear evidence that the defendant
possesses incriminating evidence; and 4) a real possibility of its destruction
should before-the-fact notice be given.35 A recent House of Lords decision
invokes the privilege against self-incrimination to reduce the scope of Anton
Pd/er orders.
36
B. Earlv American Federal Practice
1. Prohibition of Ex Parte Injunctions
During the nineteenth century, American federal courts faced an insur-
mountable obstacle in developing ex parte relief. In accordance with its
power to create and regulate lesser federal courts, 37 Congress flatly prohib-
ited the first federal courts from issuing ex parte injunctions. 38 Although one
32. 1 All E.R. 779 (1976).
33. Entick v. Carrington, (1765) 2 Wils. 275, (1558-1774) All E.R. Rep. 41.
34. 1 All E.R. at 783.
35. Id. at 784.
36. Rank Film Distributors, Ltd. v. Video Information Centre, 2 All E.R. 76 (1981). Cases
in Nigeria, South Africa, Hong Kong, and Canada adhere to the Anton PItler Doctrine. Bigger,
Notes/iom Other Nations, 71 TRADEMARK REP. 257 (1981); Cohen, Anton Piller to the Rescue-Ex
Parte Seizure Order in Counterfeittng Action in Canada, 71 TRADEMARK REP. 266 (1981).
37. U.S. CONST. art. III, § 1; Judiciary Act of 1793, 1 Stat. 333 (1793).
38. Section 5 of the judiciary Act of 1793 provided that: "Nor shall a writ of injunction be
granted in any case without reasonable previous notice to the adverse party, or his attorney, of
[Vol. 61:4
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commentary maintains that the rule against ex parte orders was disregarded
in practice, 39 only one decision supports this argument. 40 Although unre-
ported cases may have ignored the rule against ex parte orders, reported
cases follow the statute.
41
The effect of the 1793 prohibition was to handicap federal courts, which
were helpless to assist in emergencies. For example, in Perry v. Parker,42 the
plaintiff, an upstream mill owner, requested an injunction without notice to
prevent the defendant from destroying dams. These dams provided water to
operate the plaintiff's mill, and defendants had already destroyed several of
them. Although the plaintiff had maintained the dams for over sixty years
and was threatened with immediate financial ruin, the court could not grant
ex parte temporary relief because of the Judiciary Act. 43 Thus, the federal
courts were essentially powerless against unscrupulous parties who would use
the delay of giving notice to accomplish the very act which the plaintiff
wanted enjoined.
By 1866, signs of judicial exasperation with the rule were obvious. In
Mowre; v. Indianapo/is & Cincinnati R.R.,4 4 the court grudgingly dissolved an
ex parte restraining order with these words:
Equity would seem to demand that, in cases of emergency, where
irreparable injury would follow unless an immediate injunction
were ordered, the national courts should have power to grant tem-
porary injunctions without notice of the application for them to the
party enjoined. But the act of congress of March 2, 1793, forbids
(such relief).
45
In Mowrey, the district judge granted an ex parte injunction pending hear-
ings on a temporary injunction. On the day of the hearing, he held that the
ex parte injunction was premature, and dissolved it.46 At the hearing, how-
ever, the plaintiff was granted a preliminary injunction. Therefore, even
though the judge rescinded his order for a restraining order without notice,
the order remained in place long enough to prevent the defendant from ir-
reparably injuring the plaintiff.
2. Early Standards for Ex Parte Injunctions
By the early 1870's, Congress apparently decided that federal law
should reflect the federal courts' needs for ex parte injunctions in certain
areas. In 1870, for example, Congress revised the patent laws and conferred
the time and place of moving the same." 1 Stat. 333, 335 (1793). U.S. (4 Dall.) 1, 2 (1799).
There was also no inherent equity power.
39. FRANKFURTER & GREENE, THE LABOR INJUNCTION 183 (1930).
40. In Love v. Fendall's Trustees, 15 F. Cas. 993 (C.C.D.C. 1801) (No. 8547), a circuit
court granted an injunction without notice, but no explanation was given for the decision.
41. See, e.g., Mowre v. Indianapolis & C. R. Co., 17 F. Cas. 930 (C.C.D. Ind. 1866) (No.
9891); Wynn v. Wilson, 30 F. Cas. 751 (C.C.D. Ark. 1855) (No. 18,116); Wilson v. Stolley, 30 F.
Cas. 226 (C.C.D. Ohio 1847) (No. 17,839) and Perry v. Parker, 19 F. Cas. 291 (C.C.D. Mass.
1846) (No. 11,010).
42. 19 F. Gas. 291 (C.C.D. Mass. 1846) (No. 11,010).
43. Id. at 292.
44. 17 F. Gas. 930 (G.C.D. Ind. 1866) (No. 9891).




general equity powers to the federal courts in patent matters. 47 Two years
later, Congress extended this freedom to all actions and suits before the fed-
eral courts.
48
This important change in federal court powers was first recognized in
Yuenghng v. Johnson,49 a patent infringement case. Relying on the revised
patent law and section 7 of the Judiciary Act of 1872, the court granted a
restraining order without notice. In Yuenghng, the plaintiff, who owned
rights to a patented invention, tried to prevent the state of Virginia from
buying an infringing device for tallying drinks sold in barrooms. The circuit
court granted an ex parte injunction because 1) the plaintiff had made a
solid case based on an earlier ruling by the Patent Office that the new device
infringed the patented invention, 2) the state government's intention to
widely distribute the infringing device to tavern owners for liquor taxation
would deprive the plaintiff of its exclusive right to exploit the invention and
would cause irreparable injury, 3) the court had statutory power to grant the
injunction without notice to the defendant, and 4) the plaintiff had posted
$10,000 bond should the injunction have been granted wrongly. 50 Although
the court in Yueng/ing pronounced that "There is no doubt of the power...
to instantly restrain in any urgent case,"'5 1 the use of ex parte relief was still
considered an exception to general federal practice in 1885.52
Gradually federal courts developed standards for granting motions for
ex parte restraining orders. One primary purpose in granting ex parte relief
was to maintain the status quo between the parties until both sides could be
considered at a preliminary injunction hearing. 53 Section 718 of the 1874
Revised Statutes specifically gave federal courts this equity power "to pre-
serve the status quo when there is danger of irreparable injury from delay in
giving notice."
'54
The most important criterion in the evaluations of the status quo, how-
ever, was whether the defendant would use notice of the hearing to his own
advantage. One court observed that the purpose of ex parte relief was to
preserve the status quo between the parties "where notice of the application
47. 16 Stat. 206 (1872); See Yeungling v. Johnson 30 F. Cas. 896, 897 (C.C.E.D. Va. 1877)
(No. 18,195).
48. Section 7 of the Judiciary Act of 1872 states that: [W]henever notice is given of a
motion for an injunction out of a circuit or district court of the United States, the court orjudge
thereof may, if there appear [sic] to be danger of irreparable injury from delay, grant an order
restraining the act sought to be enjoined until the decision upon the motion. Such order may be
granted with or without security, in the discretion of the court or judge. Judiciary Act of 1872,
Ch. 255, § 7, 17 Stat. 197 (1872), § 718 Rev. Stat. (1874). One federal court clarified this curi-
ous language by insisting that " 'Whenever' means 'at' whatever time notice is given, and does
not mean 'after' whatever time.'" Yuengling v. Johnson, 30 F. Cas. 896, 898 (C.C.E.D. Va.
1811) (No. 18,195).
49. Yuengling v. Johnson, 30 F. Cas. 896 (C.C.E.D. Va. 1877) (No. 18,195).
50. Id.
51. Id. at 898.
52. Central Trust Co. v. Wabash, St. L. & P. Ry. Co., 25 F. 1, 2 (C.C.E.D. Mo. 1885).
53. Industrial & Mining Guar. Co. v. Electrical Supply Co., 58 F. 732, 738 (6th Cir. 1893).
54. Houghton v. Cortelyou, 208 U.S. 149, 156 (1908); Phillips v. Sager, 276 F. 625, 627
(D.C. Cir. 1921); Gring v. Chesapeake & Delaware Canal Co., 129 F. 996, 1000 (D. Del.), cert.
dented, 212 U.S. 575 (1904); Industrial & Mining Guar. Co. v. Electrical Supply Co., 58 F. 732,
738 (6th Cir. 1893).
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would itself be productive of the mischief apprehended by inducing the de-
fendant to accelerate the completion of the action sought to be enjoined
before process could be served. '" 5 The Third Circuit used this principle to
protect intellectual property rights in Thullen v. Triumph Electric Co.56 Tri-
umph Electric sought to compel an employee to honor a patent assignment
contract for an electric motor controller he had developed. The company
feared that the inventor was about to sell the patent rights to a competitor,
and cause the company irreparable injury. Because notice to the employee
would only hasten his attempts to sell the patent, leaving the company with-
out a remedy, the court granted a restraining order without notice.57 The
court founded its action on Equity Rule 73 of the Supreme Court.
58
The Supreme Court had promulgated Equity Rule 73 in 1912 to regu-
late the use of ex parte orders. Included among the requirements of Rule 73
was proof of immediate and irreparable loss demonstrated by specific facts,
shown by affidavit or verified motion. 59 Rule 73 also placed a ten day limit
on ex parte temporary restraining orders and permitted the defendant to
request its dissolution on two days notice. 60 The rule required two other
conditions: 1) an apparent danger of irreparable injury from delay,61 and
2) notice to the restrained party of a motion for preliminary injunction.
62
Courts required a clear showing of irreparable injury to grant ex parte
relief. The party requesting relief generally needed to submit documentary
evidence, such as affidavits, of the threatened injury to persuade the court to
use its extraordinary powers. 63 For example, an ex parte injunction would
not issue if the injurious behavior had existed for years, for then it repre-
55. Industrial & Mining Guar. Co. v. Electrical Supply Co., 58 F. 732, 738 (6th Cir. 1893).
56. 212 F. 243 (3d Cir. 1914).
57. Id. at 145.
58. The rule states:
No preliminary injunction shall be granted without notice to the opposite party.
Nor shall any temporary restraining order be granted without notice to the opposite
party, unless it shall clearly appear from specific facts, shown by affidavit or by the
verified bill, that immediate and irreparable loss or damage will result to the applicant
before the matter can be heard on notice. In case a temporary restraining order shall
be granted without notice, in the contingency specified, the matter shall be made re-
turnable at the earliest possible time, and in no event later than ten days from the date
of the order, and shall take precedence of all matters, except older matters of the same
character. When the matter comes up for hearing the party who obtained the tempo-
rary restraining order shall proceed with his application for a preliminary injunction,
and if he does not do so the court shall dissolve his temporary restraining order. Upon
two days notice to the party obtaining such temporary restraining order, the opposite
party may appear and move the dissolution or modification of the order, and in that
event the court or judge shall proceed to hear and determine the motion as expedi-
tiously as the ends of justice may require. Every temporary restraining order shall be
forthwith filed in the clerk's office.
226 U.S. 670.
59. Id. See also 212 F. at 145.
60. Rule 73 is nearly identical to section 17 of the Clayton Act, 28 U.S.C. § 381 (1982),
which Congress passed in 1914 in a vain attempt to prevent the abuse of labor injunctions, see
FRANKFURTER & GREENE, THE LABOR INJUNCTION, 184 n.196 (1930), and which resembles
the current Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 65(b).
61. Payne v. Kansas & A. V. Ry. Co., 46 F. 546, 552 (C.C.W.D. Ark. 1891).
62. See Chicago, B. & Q. Ry. Co. v. Burlington, C.R. & N. Ry., 34 F. 481 (S.D. Iowa 1888),
in which a motion for ex parte restraint was denied because of failure to give this notice.
63. Central Trust Co. v. Wabash, St. L. & P. Ry. Co., 25 F. 1, 2 (C.C.E.D. Mo. 1885).
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sented no immediate harm.
64
The application for ex parte relief also required a firm legal basis, i.e., a
likelihood of success at the trial on the merits. If the moving party had no
legal argument supporting the request for ex parte relief, then the restraining
order would be dissolved immediately. 65 Also, the presence of many sub-
stantive legal questions, including the validity of a contract on which an
obligation is asserted, defeated motions for ex parte restraining orders.
66
Federal courts also considered the balance of convenience and hardship
between the parties. If little or no injury would be suffered by the restrained
party, but great injury could be suffered by the moving party if the court did
not act, then courts granted ex parte relief.67 Under this balancing test, for
example, a court restrained a businessman from selling property that was
alleged to be undistributed partnership proceeds owed to the plaintiff. Be-
cause the delay could leave the plaintiff without a remedy, and the defend-
ant would merely be inconvenienced by the delay, the court granted an ex
parte restraining order.
68
3. Abuses During the Labor Period
Ex parte orders remained uncommon until shortly before the industrial
warfare of the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries. 69 It was here,
in the use of restraining orders against organized labor, that the authority to
grant ex parte injunctions was frequently abused.
During this period, the ex parte injunction became a favorite tool of
both management and government to quash industrial strikes. Apparently,
ex parte injunctions were issued on affidavits without comprehensive knowl-
edge of the facts. 70 Under the legal pretense that strikers were in contempt
of court orders, courts permitted police and government troops to rout and
imprison strikers.
Perhaps the most famous strike in which an ex parte injunction was
issued was the Pullman strike in 1894. The U.S. Supreme Court affirmed
the ex parte injunction granted to the U.S. Attorney General to break the
strike in In re Debs.7 ' Finding that the confusion caused to interstate com-
merce by a railroad strike was irreparable injury, the Supreme Court ruled
that the issue of an injunctib against the strikers without notice was justi-
64. Gring v. Chesapeake & Del. Canal Co., 129 F. 996, 1000 (C.C.D. Del. 1904), cert. dented,
212 U.S. 575 (1904); Worth Mfg. Co. v. Bingham, 116 F. 785, 789 (4th Cir. 1902).
65. Central Trust Co. v. Wabash, St. L. & P. Ry. Co., 25 F. 1, 2 (C.C.E.D. Mo. 1885).
66. Paine v. United States Playing Card Co., 90 F. 543, 544 (C.C.D.N.J. 1898).
67. Phillips v. Sager, 276 F. 625, 627 (D.C. Cir. 1921); Gring v. Chesapeake & Del. Canal
Co., 129 F. 996, 1000 (C.C.D. Del 1904), cert. denied, 212 U.S. 5757 (1904).
68. Phillips v. Sager, 276 F. 625, 627 (D.C. Cir. 1921).
69. The Judiciary Act of 1872, supra note 46, granted federal courts the power to issue ex
parte injunctions. The federal courts made little use of the power before using it to quash
industrial strikes. See note, The Abolition of Ex Parte Injunctions in New York, 30 COLUM. L. REV.
1184 (1930).
70. Note, Ex Partelnjunctions, 1 BROOKLYN L. REV. 101, 102 n.4 (1932) (quoting New York
State Governor Smith's annual message of 1926).
71. 158 U.S. 564 (1895).
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fled. 72 A widespread belief arose that the federal courts were being used as
the tools of employers.
73
Popular resentment of the federal courts and injunctions without notice
quickly swelled, and soon they were under political attack. In 1896, political
parties denounced "government by injunction" as a dangerous form of op-
pression by the quasi-aristocratic federal courts. 74 The cry was raised again
in 1908, and one year later President Taft, a former Supreme Court Justice,
urged that Congress more strictly regulate the use of ex parte injunctions.
The plea was repeated in 1910. Several bills which would limit the power of
federal courts to issue injunctions without notice, and thereby prevent the
issuance of injunctions in labor disputes, were brought before Congress.
7 5
Although these efforts failed, the public outcry against ex parte injunctions
did not subside, and the fight was carried to state legislatures. By the late
1920's, several states had passed laws prohibiting the use of injunctions with-
out notice.
76
4. Limitations of Procedural Due Process
Although these states had misgivings about the issuance of orders with-
out notice, federal courts exhibited no uncertainty about continuing the use
of their comparatively new power. During the World War II era the
Supreme Court endorsed the use of ex parte orders to enforce administrative
action. Court orders without notice were considered in Fahey v. Mallonee,77
and Ewing v. Mytinger &Cassdberry.78 In Fahey, the Supreme Court reiterated
that it would dissolve ex parte temporary restraining orders if irreparable
injury is not threatened to the moving party, 79 but emphasized that federal
courts had the clear authority to issue such orders on behalf of administra-
tive agencies.
80
In Ewbig, the Supreme Court addressed the validity of ex parte seizure
orders grounded in statute. A food supplement company contested, as a vio-
lation of due process, the Food and Drug Administration's (FDA) statutory
power to seize misbranded foods and drugs without notice. The Supreme
72. Id. at 599-600.
73. Note, supra note 71, at 102 n.4 (1932). Although much of the legal community de-
fended the actions of federal courts during this time, see, e.g., Whitelock, supra note 1, the Ameri-
can Federation of Labor had another viewpoint and alleged that judicial power had been
abused in twenty-three strikes. Id. at 733. A study by the Columbia School of Business deter-
mined that, of 441 applications for labor injunctions in New York State between 1880 and 1930,
303 or 68.7% were immediately granted ex parte. Of these 303 orders, 70 or 23% were vacated
at hearings. Many others were probably never brought to a hearing to have their validity con-
tested. Note, 30 COLUM. L. REV. 1184, 1187 n.24 (1930). By the time an order was vacated,
however, the strike usually would be broken. FRANKFURTER & GREENE, THE LABOR INJUNC-
TION, 183 n.189 (1930).
74. Whitelock, supra note 1, at 732.
75. See, e.g., Pearre Bill, Beveridge Bill, and Gilbert Bill as Whitelock, supra note 1, at 738-
40 (1912).
76. Among these were New York, Wisconsin, Minnesota, Kansas, and Massachusetts.
Note, supra note 73 at 1186-87.
77. 322 U.S. 245 (1947).
78. 339 U.S. 594 (1950).




Court upheld the FDA's use of ex parte seizures and decided that due pro-
cess is not violated if a hearing is held before the administrative order be-
comes final. Perhaps more importantly, the majority opinion by Justice
Douglas discussed the probability that ex parte seizures could irreparably
injure the business reputation of defendants, but concluded that due process
does not require a full judicial hearing before the government can take ac-
tion in administrative matters.8 ' Douglas stated that when property rights
are involved due process requires only an opportunity for a hearing and a
judicial determination at some stage of the proceedings.
8 2
This case ushered in an era of due process attacks on the granting of ex
parte relief. One commentator observed that the procedural due process de-
velopments of the early 1970's, which restricted many traditional ex parte
remedies, created a judicial prejudice against the use of temporary re-
straining orders and seizure orders in intellectual property disputes. 83 Ad-
mittedly, procedural due process requirements have restricted the
opportunities for obtaining ex parte relief. The leading cases on procedural
due process, however, still recognize the need in some circumstances for
court orders without notice.
84
In a 1972 landmark case, Fuentes v. Shevin,8 5 the Supreme Court invali-
dated a state replevin law which permitted ex parte seizures. The Court
limited its holding by stating that "There are 'extraordinary situations' that
justify postponing notice and opportunity for a hearing."86 This sentiment
was forecast in Carroll v. President and Comm's of Princess Anne,8 7 and echoed in
Mitchell v. W. T Grant Co.88 In Mitchell, the Supreme Court upheld the valid-
ity of a state statute permitting creditors to seize the property of recalcitrant
debtors. The presence of procedural safeguards protecting the debtor, and
the "real risk that the buyer, with possession and power over the goods, will
conceal or transfer the merchandise to the damage of the seller were critical
to the decision." '89 Faced with such a situation, the Court observed that,
"the danger of destruction or alienation cannot be guarded against if notice
and a hearing before seizure are supplied. The notice itself may furnish a
warning to the debtor acting in bad faith." 90
Fuentes identifies three circumstances that justify ex parte relief consis-
tent with procedural due process: 1) important governmental or general
public interests; 2) a special need for very prompt action; or 3) the seizure is
initiated by a government official, acting under a narrowly drawn statute,
who believes that the seizure was necessary and justified. 9 1 These circum-
81. Ewing v. Mytinger & Casselberry, 339 U.S. 594, 599 (1950).
82. Id.
83. Bainton, supra note 3, at 460.
84. See Carroll v. President & Comm'rs of Princess Anne, 393 U.S. 175 (1968) and Granny
Goose Foods, Inc. v. Local 70, Bhd. of Teamsters, 415 U.S. 423 (1974).
85. 407 U.S. 67 (1972)
86. Id. at 90.
87. 393 U.S. 175 (1968).
88. 416 U.S. 600 (1974).
89. Id. at 608-09.
90. Id. at 609.
91. 407 U.S. at 91.
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stances qualify the use of ex parte remedies to protect property rights. Seri-
ous mischief creates a special need for prompt action if the intellectual
property owner is to have any relief at all. In addition, important public
interests are served by the use of injunctions and seizure orders issued with-
out notice. In trademark infringement disputes, for example, the Lanham
Act 92 provides for relief when there is a likelihood of public confusion. In
copyright and patent actions, ex parte orders serve an important governmen-
tal interest. The copyright and patent clause of the Constitution provides
that Congress shall promote the "Progress of Science and Useful Arts."
'9
Infringers violate this statutory plan and its constitutional basis by trading
on the efforts of others.
As Fuentes identified the circumstances which deserve ex parte relief, so
Mitchell suggested the procedures required to legitimate the relief. First, the
ex parte order should be personally issued by a judge, rather than a clerk.
Second, there must be a substantial risk of irreparable injury to a property
interest. Third, the plaintiff must establish the probability of success on the
merits. Fourth, the plaintiff must present documentary proof of the defend-
ant's wrongdoing. Fifth, the plaintiff must post bond to compensate the de-
fendant for wrongful restraint. Finally, a full hearing must be permitted
after the seizure to determine the rights between the parties.94 In intellec-
tual property disputes, temporary relief without notice can easily accommo-
date these procedural requirements. Judges should carefully scrutinize
seizure orders, especially those requesting assistance from federal marshalls.
Irreparable injury occurs, by statutory definition, whenever copyright, trade-
mark, or patent rights are infringed. At ex parte hearings, judges may con-
sider documentary evidence, such as affidavits, to determine the probability
of success on the merits. The Federal Rules of Civil Procedure require bonds
to protect the innocent defendant from the overzealous plaintiff.95 Finally,
Rule 65(b) requires that a full hearing be held within two days of the issu-
ance of an ex parte temporary restraining order.
96
II. CONTEMPORARY Ex PARTE TEMPORARY RELIEF
A. Overview
Despite the specific authorization and procedural safeguards of Rule
65(b), many federal district courts are still extremely reluctant to grant tem-
porary restraining orders unless notice is first provided.97 Some of this reluc-
tance may be attributed to healthy judicial skepticism. When immediate
and irreparable injury is threatened, however, the unwillingness of some
courts to issue ex parte orders in these situations can only be attributed to
misunderstanding, lassitude, ignorance, or even outright hostility.98 In Na-
92. 15 U.S.C. §§ 1051-1127 (1982).
93. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8.
94. Mitchell v. W.T. Grant Co., 416 U.S. 600, 608-10 (1974).
95. FED. R. Civ. P. 65(b). See supra note 10.
96. Id
97. See Katz and Cohen, Oblainig Ex Parte Injunctions and Impoundment Orders, MERCHANDIS-
ING REP. Nov. 1983, at 6.
98. Comment, supra note 4 at 116 n.j 1; see also Vuitton et Fils. S.A., 606 F.2d 1, 3 n.5 (2d
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tional Football League Properties, Inc. v. Coniglto,99 for example, a district court
judge believed that merely frightening bootleggers from the immediate area
would relieve threatened injuries and denied plaintiff's request for an ex
parte seizure order. The judge did not consider the possibility that bootleg-
gers would merely regroup elsewhere.
The use of ex parte temporary relief is rapidly expanding in the field of
intellectual property, where infringers and counterfeiters threaten the prop-
erty rights of inventors, artists, and businesses with irreparable injury to rep-
utation and profits. When notice is given, these covert dealers are more
often encouraged to flee than to account for their activities. Therefore, ex
parte temporary restraining orders, inspections, and seizure orders must be
permitted in intellectual property disputes to preserve the status quo and to
prevent irreparable injury until a hearing can take place.00
B. Statutoiy Bases for Relief
Several federal statutes authorize ex parte temporary relief, including
the Lanham Act' 1 for trademarks, the Copyright Act, 1° 2 and the Patent




The Lanham Act 105 protects intellectual property rights in trademarks.
The Act permits federal courts to issue injunctions "according to the princi-
ples of equity" to prevent trademark infringement. 106 Any unauthorized use
of a registered trademark is infringement if it "is likely to cause confusion, or
to cause mistake, or to deceive."' 0 7 Federal courts have consistently ruled
that a likelihood of confusion between registered trademarks and infringing
marks threatens irreparable injury to trademark owners and entitles them to
injunctive relief.10 8 Seizure of infringing merchandise is authorized by sec-
tion 36 of the Lanham Act.109
Ex parte temporary relief is primarily used to combat counterfeit and
Cir. 1979), (writ of mandamus directed a district court judge to stop considering motions for ex
parte temporary relief as "vexatious").
99. 554 F. Supp. 1224 (D.D.C. 1983).
100. See Granny Goose Foods, Inc. v. Brotherhood of Teamsters, 415 U.S. 423, 439 (1974).
101. 15 U.S.C. §§ 1051-1127 (1982).
102. 17 U.S.C. §§ 1-810 (1982).
103. 35 U.S.C. §§ 1-293 (1982).
104. 14 U.L.A. 539-51 (1980). In addition, three special situations are found in 28 U.S.C.
relating to temporary restraining orders, 28 U.S.C. §§ 2281-2282 restrain the operation of the
state or federal statute, 28 U.S.C. § 2283 restrains state court proceedings and 28 U.S.C § 2284
provides for three-judge court injunction procedures. It is not the purpose of this section to set
forth and discuss the prima facie proof required of the ex parte movant. References are pro-
vided which discuss these requirements in detail.
105. 15 U.S.C. §§ 1111-1127 (1982).
106. 15 U.S.C. § 1116 (1982).
107. 15 U.S.C. § 1114 (1982).
108. E.g., Franklin Mint, Inc. v. Franklin Mint, Ltd., 331 F. Supp. 827, 830 (D.C. Pa. 1971).
109. The elements of proof including irreparable injury and the procedural aspects neces-
sary for proving entitlement in trademark cases are discussed in Dorr & Duft, Trademark relimi-
nag Injuntive Relief 62 J. PAT. OFF. Soc'Y 3 (Jan. 1980). See Bainton, supra note 3; Purcell, Use
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"gray market" goods. Counterfeit goods are goods of generally low quality
sold as genuine merchandise to the unsuspecting public. Gray market goods
are genuine merchandise, imported illegally to the United States without
authorization by the trademark owner." 0
2. Copyrights
Copyright protection applies to literature, computer software, music,
drama, motion pictures, sound recordings, business documents, fine arts, and
any other original work "fixed in a tangible medium of expression.""'
Copyright owners are entitled to the exclusive rights to reproduce, display,
perform, and distribute the work, as well as to prepare derivative works
based on the copyrighted material." 2 Any violation of these exclusive rights
is a copyright infringement"13 which may be restrained by temporary or per-
manent injunction 1 14 and is subject to a suit for damages. 115 Infringing arti-
cles may be impounded and destroyed by court order." 1 6 The Special Rules
of Practice, promulgated by the U.S. Supreme Court under the Copyright
Act of 1909, permit the U.S. Marshall to seize allegedly infringing materials,
including the materials used for making the infringing copies. "
7
Ex parte temporary relief has increased in copyright counterfeiting situ-
ations involving video games, software, and toys." 8
3. Patents
Patents have the attributes of personal property, and give patent owners
the exclusive rights to develop, market, license, or sell the invention to
others. 119 Anyone who makes, sells, or uses the invention without authoriza-
tion from the patent owner has infringed the patent.' 20 Federal courts have
been empowered since 1870 to protect patent rights by issuing injunc-
tions.' 2 ' In unusual situations, infringing articles may be destroyed by court
of'John Doe" TRO's Against Counterfeiters, Merchandising Rep., Oct. 1983, at 16; Comment, supra
note 4, at 701.
110. See Dorr and Traphagen, Lurking in the Shadows: The Gray Market Threat to Trademark
Owners, MERCHANDISING REP., Dec.-Jan. 1983-84, at 33.
111. 17 U.S.C. § 102 (1982).
112. 17 U.S.C. § 106 (1982).
113. 17 U.S.C. § 501 (1982).
114. 17 U.S.C. § 502 (1982).
115. 17 U.S.C. §504 (1982).
!16. 17 U.S.C. §503 (1982).
117. See The Rules of Practice for Copyright Cases 3-13 (Annots. of 17 U.S.C.A. § 501).
These rules are considered applicable under the Copyright Act of 1978. Sugarman & Miller,
Prelminary Temporary Restraining Orders, in LITIGATING COPYRIGHT, TRADEMARK & UNFAIR
COMPETITION CASES, 271 n.4 (R. Sugarman, ed., 1983). They have also been found constitu-
tional. Jondora Music Publishing Co. v. Melody Recordings, Inc., 362 F. Supp. 494, 499-500
(D.N.J.), vacated on other grounds, 506 F.2d 392, cert denied, 421 U.S. 1012 (1973).
118. See Katz and Cohen, supra note 97 at 6; Dorr and Eigles, Resolving Claims to Ownership of
Software and Computer-Stored Data- The Importance of Temporaty Restraining Orders and Preliminary
Injunctions, COMPUTER L. REV. (1984).
119. 35 U.S.C. §261 (1982).
120. 35 U.S.C. § 271 (1982).




Ex parte relief in patent cases, although clearly based in history, is
rarely granted by a court. The reason appears to be the technical complex-
ity of the subject matter and the high rate with which litigated patents are
invalidated. 123
4. Trade Secrets
At present, there is no federal statutory law for the protection of trade
secrets. Trade secret protection is primarily based on the states' common
law of unfair competition.
The Uniform Trade Secrets Act, 124 has been enacted in Kansas, Arkan-
sas, Louisiana, Minnesota, Idaho, North Carolina and Washington.125 Sec-
tion 2 of the Act provides that "actual or threatened misappropriation may
be enjoined. . . . (c) In appropriate circumstances, affirmative acts to pro-
tect a trade secret may be compelled by court order."'
126
It is unknown whether "affirmative acts" would extend to ex parte
seizures, impoundments, and inspections. One commentator with respect to
this provision states:
Among the "affirmative acts" that may be ordered are surrender of
physical embodiments of the trade secret and the taking of defini-
tive steps by the misappropriator to prevent further illegal disclo-
sure of the trade secret to others. This could sometimes entail
extraordinary measures, such as special directives to employees and
agents or a substantial revision of operations incorporating the mis-
appropriated trade secret. 127 (citations omitted).
C. Federal Court Standards for Ex Parte Temporary Relief
Rule 65 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure sets forth the rule for
granting of temporary restraining orders.' 28 This rule is taken from 28
U.S.C. § 381, which was based upon former Equity Rule 73. This rule does
not confer the power to grant injunctive relief, but rather sets stringent pro-
cedural requirements for the court's use of equity powers. Most states have
122. See American Caramel Co. v. Thomas Mills & Bro., 162 F. 147 (C.C.A. Pa. 1907); Lion
Mfg. Corporation v. Chicago Flexible Shaft Co., 106 F.2d 930 (7th Cir. 1939).
123. See Dorr and Duft, Patent Preliminay Injunctive Relief 60 J. PAT. OFF. SOc'Y 597-635
(Oct. 1978). One commentator has called for the increased use of temporary injunctions in
patent cases and has challenged the new Federal Circuit Court of Appeals to clarify its require-
ments. See Duft, Patent Preliminag Injunctions and the United States Court of Appeals for the Federal
Circuit, 65 J. PAT. OFF. SOC'Y 131-52 (March, 1983).
124. 14 U.L.A. 537-51 (1980).
125. La Fuze, The Uniform Trade Secrets Act, Oregon-Washington Patent Law Seminar,
Feb. 26, 1982. The Commission on Uniform Laws is now considering whether the Act is so
seriously flawed that it needs amendment. Telephone interview with William LaFuze, Chair-
man of the Intellectual Property Section of the Texas Bar Association (May 7, 1984).
126. 14 U.L.A. 544 (1980).
127. Klitzke, The Uniform Trade Secret Act, 64 MARQ. L. REV. 277, 303-304 (1980). See
also Berryill, Trade Secret Litigation: Injuncttns and other equitable remedies, 48 U. COLO. L. REV. 189
(1977).
128. FED. R. Ctv. P. 65(b), supra n.10.
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statutes or civil practice rules similar to Federal Rule 65.129 Local practices
for temporary restraining orders must be studied on a court-by-court basis
before seeking ex parte temporary relief.
1. Duties of Movant Prior to Ex Parte Hearing
Rule 65(b) specifically permits the granting of a temporary restraining
order without written or oral notice to either the adverse party or to his
attorney provided:
a. An affidavit or verified complaint sets forth specific facts indi-
cating that immediate and irreparable injury, loss, or damage
will result if the defendant or his attorney receives notice. The
affidavit must be free of hearsay, should not contain conclusory
statements, and should be free from obvious evidentiary
problems. A statement by the plaintiff that he "fears" that ir-
reparable harm will occur or affidavits based on "information
and belief,"' 130 are clearly not sufficient and,
b. The applicant's attorney certifies in writing his reasons that
notice should not be required. These reasons include the de-
struction or secreting of evidence, or the removal of items from
the jurisdiction of the court.
13 1
From a practical viewpoint, the attorney faces a considerable amount of
activity in preparing the verified complaint, the support affidavits, the pro-
posed order, and any other documents required by the court. Time is of the
essence and all preparation must be completed in a matter of hours. There is
simply not enough time for carefully considered decisions. Spur-of-the-mo-
ment decisions may lead to fatal mistakes. In this "pressure cooker" environ-
ment, the movant's attorney must take great pains to state the facts in the
affidavit and verified complaint with painstaking accuracy and truthfulness.
In extreme emergencies, filing the verified complaint may be delayed
and the entire proceeding commenced by an order to show cause supported
solely by the affidavit. The complaint, however, must be filed before the
court's order issues. 132
129. Eg., Illinois Injunctions Act, ILL. REV. STAT. 1983, Ch. 69, § 3 and Colo. Rules of Civ.
Pro., Rule 65.
130. Marshall Durbin Farms v. National Farmers Organization, 446 F.2d 353, 354 (5th Cir.
197 1). See Nussbaum, TEMPORARY RESTRAINING ORDERS AND PRELIMINARY INJUNCTIONS -
THE FEDERAL PRACTICE, 26 S.W. L.J. 265, 266-67 (1972), for practical suggestions in drafting
affidavits.
131. Wallace Berrie & Co. v. Custom Style Toys, COPYRIGHT L. REP. (CCH) 25,492
(D.C.N.Y. 1982). The requirement of attorney certification resulted from criticisms of the "for-
mal notice requirement" found in Pennsylvania R.R. Co. v. Transport Workers Union, 278
F.2d 693, 694 (3d Cir. 1960); Arvida Co. v. Sugarman, 259 F.2d 428, 429 (2d Cir. 1958); and
Lummus Company v. Commonwealth Oil Refinery Co., 297 F.2d 80, 83 (2d Cir. 1961) cert.
dented, 368 U.S. 986 (1962). However, the comments to the 1966 amendment to Rule 65b incor-
porating the certification requirement concluded by stating that "The amended subdivision
continues to recognize that a temporary restraining order may be issued without any notice
when the circumstances warrant." Federal Rules 146 (West 1983).




Under Rule 65, temporary restraining orders and seizure orders are, like
preliminary injunctions, forms of extraordinary relief that potentially can
seriously injure the defendant. For this reason, the plaintiff's burden of ob-
taining an ex parte order is heavy and the standards for granting prelimi-
nary injunctions are often instructive. One clear purpose of granting a
temporary restraining order is to preserve the status quo until the court can
consider a preliminary injunction motion. 133 Therefore, at the temporary
hearing, the court ordinarily will not apply those standards determinative of
entitlement for a preliminary injunction, but will be concerned primarily
with preserving the status quo and preventing irreparable injury.
134
The following cases are typical of the requirements for obtaining ex
parte temporary orders. In Murphy v. Society of Real Estate Apprazsers,135 the
court required the plaintiff to prove the following four elements:
1. Irreparable harm to the plaintiff in absence of the temporary
restraining order,
2. The balance of public interest favored the temporary order,
3. Harm to other interested parties if the temporary restraining
order was not granted, and
4. Likelihood of success on the merits at trial.
The decision of the Second Circuit Court of Appeals in Vutton et Fils,
SA., 136 stated that Rule 65(b):
[B]y its very terms allows for the issuance of an ex parte temporary
restraining order when (1) the failure to issue it would result in
"immediate and irreparable injury, loss, or damage" and (2) the
applicant sufficiently demonstrates the reason that notice "should
not be required." In a trademark infringement case such as this, a
substantial likelihood of confusion constitutes, in and of itself, ir-
reparable injury sufficient to satisfy the requirements of Rule
65(b)(1). 137
The court also observed that it would be unfair to require trademark owners
to give notice to counterfeiters because:
[N]otice all too often appears to serve only to render fruitless fur-
ther prosecution of the action. This is precisely contrary to the nor-
mal and intended role of "notice", and it is surely not what the
authors of the rule either anticipated or intended.
138
Attorneys must emphasize the clear irreparable harm to the plaintiff
133. United States v. Washington Post Co., 446 F.2d 1322 (D.C. Cir. 1971); Weyenberg v.
Town of Menasha, 401 F. Supp. 801 (E.D.Wis. 1975); and Davis v. Emerson Ins. Agency, 423 F.
Supp. 561 (D.Neb. 1976).
134. Dow Chemical Co. v. Blum, 469 F. Supp. 892, 901 (E.D. Mich. 1979); Black v. Trans-
port Workers Union, 454 F. Supp. 813, 816 (S.D.N.Y.) affd, 594 F. 2d 851 (2d Cir. 1978);
Uneeda Doll Co. v. Regent Baby Products Corp., 355 F. Supp. 438, 445 (E.D.N.Y. 1972).
135. 388 F. Supp. 1046, 1049 (E.D.Wis. 1975), vacated, 544 F.2d 521 (7th Cir. 1976). Al-
though the district court denied the motion because of failure to show probability of success on
the merits, the court of appeals disagreed.
136. 606 F.2d I (2d Cir. 1979).
137. Id at 4.
138. Id at 5.
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and why notice must not be given in a particular case. Failure to fully pres-
ent the facts to the court on these two issues will result in denial of ex parte
requests. Only after satisfying these two requirements will the court weigh
the potential harm to the parties and the public, and consider the likelihood
of success on the merits. The court should not place too much emphasis on
the evidence at this stage in evaluating the likelihood of success, but rather
reserve this matter for the preliminary injunction hearing.
From a practical point of view, the movant's attorneys have little time
to present their case to the court because most courts will hear ex parte re-
quests only during breaks between pending litigation, before normal court
hours, and sometimes even on Saturdays. Understandably, the court will
not be in the mood to read lengthy documents, to listen to long oral
presentations, or to decide complex factual or legal issues. Sometimes courts,
especially those with new judges, are unfamiliar with the law itself. There-
fore, the plaintiffs attorneys must present the case cogently, and
succinctly. 139
Increasingly, district court judges have granted ex parte orders. Today,
these extraordinary remedies have become a standard weapon to protect in-
tellectual property rights. As ex parte orders become routine, however, the
danger increases that fundamental civil rights will be trampled in the zeal to
quash counterfeiters. For example, in National Football League Properties, Inc. v.
Coniglzo,140 plaintiffs were denied seizure orders against suspected bootleg-
gers of football souvenirs during the Super Bowl.141 Although the court mis-
takenly applied the law, 14 2 the court's decision can be supported in its result
because the plaintiff requested relief that was offensive to civil rights. A
"John Doe" TRO and seizure order, in which the defendants remain un-
named, was requested. Also, the plaintiff intended to use its own private
security force, rather than U.S. Marshalls, 143 to enforce the proposed order.
Understandably, the court may have resented the plaintiff's desire to use its
own security guards to confiscate bootleg gifts throughout Washington, D.C.
This marked the boundary of acceptable ex parte orders until United
States v. Karen Bags,144 in which a federal court authorized a private under-
cover operation against businessmen who allegedly sold counterfeit Vuitton
handbags. In Karen Bags, U.S. District Court Judge Morris Lasker ap-
pointed Vuitton's attorney, Joseph Bainton, special prosecutor to conduct a
"sting" operation with Melvin Weinberg, who assisted the FBI with the infa-
mous ABSCAM investigation. 145 Using many of the investigation's tech-
niques, Bainton and Weinberg videotaped meetings with suspected
139. As one commentator has said:
An attorney has about four sentences to get the judge's attention and explain why the
temporary restraining order must be granted now. Regretably, the attorney must use
the first sentence to tell the judge who he and his clients are. That leaves about three
sentences. They should not be wasted on boring details. Bainton, supra note 3, at 470.
140. 554 F. Supp. 1224 (D.D.C. 1983).
141. d at 1226.
142. See Bainton, supra note 3.
143. 554 F. Supp. at 1225.
144. 83 Cr. Misc. 1; see Nat'l L.J., May 21, 1984, at 3, 44.
145. 83 Cr. Misc. 1, slip. op. at 3-6 (S.D.N.Y. April 9, 1984).
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infringers, who believed Weinberg to be an entrepreneur interested in coun-
terfeit manufacturing. One of the suspected infringers, Sol Klayminc, had
been convicted earlier of criminal contempt for violating an injunction
against the sale of counterfeit goods. The Vuitton operation resulted in an
Order to Show Cause against Klayminc and six other defendants.'
46
This case was the first in which a federal court authorized a private
attorney to conduct an undercover investigation, and its ramifications are
worrisome. The prospect of plaintiffs enforcing their property rights by
methods which border on unconstitutional entrapment is unpleasant for
counterfeiters, but it should also concern intellectual property owners them-
selves. Ex parte orders have been accepted because plaintiffs have a good
reputation for scrupulous investigation. Vuitton, for example, established
itself by conducting over eighty ex parte actions in New York alone.
147
Other owners may not be so scrupulous and may ride roughshod over indi-
vidual rights. This type of "cowboy" legal action endangers the willingness
of courts to grant ex parte orders when they are needed. Just as ex parte
orders were abused against labor unions, so they may be abused against
counterfeiters and other infringers. The result of such overenthusiastic en-
forcement can only be judicial disenchantment with a useful legal tool. The
ex parte order will fall into disuse until resurrected again.
3. Duties of Court
Requests for ex parte relief "take precedence of all matters except older
matters of the same character," and the court shall promptly set a hearing
on the request under Rule 65(b).' 48 If a temporary restraining order is
granted under this rule, the court must follow certain procedures such as:
a. Endorsement of the date and hour of issuance on the order,
b. Filling the order in the clerk's office for entry in the record,
c. Specifically defining plaintiff's injury and its irreparable harm
in the order,
d. Precisely stating why the order was granted without notice,
e. Setting the motion for preliminary injunction for hearing at
the earliest possible time,
f. Setting forth in the order the reasons for its issuance,
g. Describing in specific terms, and not by reference to another
document, the act or acts sought to be restrained, and
h. Binding only the parties to the action, their officers, agents,
servants, employees and attorneys and those persons in active
concert or participation with them who receive actual notice of
the order by personal service or otherwise. 1
49
The order can last no longer than ten days after entry. The ten day
146. Id at 6-7.
147. Matter of Vuitton et Fils, S.A. 606 F.2d 1, 2 (2d Cir. 1979); Nat'l L.J., May 21, 1984 at
3, 44.
148. FED. R. Civ. P. 65(b).
149. FED. R. Civ. P. 65(b). Temporary restraining orders represent relief which is granted
only in the most compelling circumstances. Hence, such orders require these strict limitations.




period can be extended for good cause shown or by consent of the restrained
party. The reasons for the court's extension must be stated and entered in
the record. Also, the temporary restraining order automatically terminates
when the court rules on the motion for preliminary injunction. Defendants
are not bound by an ex parte order until they receive actual notice, although
this notice may be informal, as a telephone call.' 5 0 Therefore, plaintiff must
notify defendant of the order and what it forbids for the ex parte order to be
effective.15 1 If any ambiguities, omissions, or errors exist in the order, they
will be resolved in favor of the defendant.'
52
4. Posting of Bond
Rule 65(c) further requires that the movant give security "in such sum
as the court deems proper" 153 in the event that the defendant is wrongfully
enjoined or restrained in order to cover his costs and damages that may be
incurred or suffered. In copyright cases, the bond must be at least twice the
reasonable value of the infringing copies. 154 The bond required for the tem-
porary restraining order does not carry over to the bond requirements for the
preliminary injunction. i55 From a practical viewpoint, the movant must ar-
range for surety before requesting relief, if the movant does not wish to risk
delaying the order. It is important to check court rules for local practice
since some courts have an "emergency" hearing provision.'
56
6. Rights of Nonmovant
Rule 65(b) entitles the restrained party to appear before the court on
two days notice and move for the disillusion or for the modification of the ex
parte order. In its discretion, the court may permit less than two day's no-
tice. The court shall "hear and determine such motion as expeditiously as
the ends of justice require."
15 7
C. Appealability of Ex Parte Orders
Generally, rulings by district courts on ex parte motions for temporary
restraining orders under Rule 65(b) are not appealable unless permission of
150. Baines v. City of Danville, 337 F.2d 579, 598-99 (4th Cir. 1964), a f'd, 384 U.S. 890
(1966).
151. See Walker v. City of Birmingham, 270 Ala. 53, 181 So. 2d 493 (1965), afd, 388 U.S.
307 (1967). Copies of the order are routinely served on defendant. D. DOBBS, REMEDIES § 2.10
at 107 (1973).
152. Ford v. Krammerer, 450 F.2d 279 (3d Cir. 1971).
153. FED. R. Civ. P. 65(c).
154. Rules of Practice 4, 17 U.S.C.A. foil. § 501.
155. Steinberg v. American Bantam Car Co., 173 F.2d 179, 181 (3d Cir. 1949).
156. For example, the Local Rules of Practice Rule 104 for the United States District Court
for the District of Colorado (December, 1983) set forth the following requirement for bonds:
a. An attorney in any case or a party in a civil case, or the spouse of a party in a civil
case, shall not be accepted as a personal surety on any bond filed in that case.
b. Where the surety on a bond is a surety company approved by the United States
Department of Treasury, a power of attorney showing the authority of the agent sign-
ing the bond shall be on file with the clerk.
c. No person, firm, association or corporation may act as his, her or its own surety in
a civil case.
157. FED. R. Civ. P. 65(b).
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the Court is obtained and then only under certain guidelines set by the ap-
pellate court.' 58 These rulings generally cannot be appealed because tempo-
rary restraining orders are neither "final decisions,"' 159 nor appealable
interlocutory orders. 160
In exceptional circumstances, however, parties may appeal temporary
restraining orders as interlocutory orders.161 Because the substantial effect
of the order, and not its terminology, controls, ' 62 the parties may appeal the
order if it more greatly resembles a preliminary injunction than a temporary
restraining order. 163 This resemblance can be determined from the length of
the order or from the relief granted.
First, an order which continues longer than the ten day limit established
by Rule 65(b) can be appealed.' 64 A temporary restraining order which
issued or extended with the consent of all parties cannot, however, be ap-
pealed.' 65 Failure to file a motion to dissolve the order can indicate con-
sent.' 66 Second, the non-movant may appeal an interlocutory order that
grants a major part of the permanent injunctive relief sought by the claim-
ant. 16 7 For example, in a 1979 sixth circuit case, a district court granted an
interlocutory order which halted an administrative investigation. The order
granted a substantial measure of the permanent relief and thus was
appealable.' 68
D. Mandamus
In Vuilon el Fils S.A.,' 6 9 the Second Circuit Court issued a writ of man-
damus to the district court after the plaintiff could not obtain an ex parte
temporary restraining order from the Southern District of New York. Al-
though this is a rare procedure, it is appropriate when district courts ignore a
movant's rights under Rule 65(b). As such, writs of mandamus should not
be overlooked as a viable procedure until reluctant federal district courts
cast aside their unwillingness to grant ex parte relief when appropriate.
E. Contempt
A party commits contempt when it violates an ex parte temporary re-
158. Fernandez-Roque v. Smith, 671 F.2d 426, 429 (1lth Cir. 1982); Clarkson Co. v.
Shaheen, 544 F.2d 624, 627 n.4 (2d Cir. 1976); Dilworth v. Riner, 343 F.2d 226, 229 (5th Cir.
1965). For special rules in arbitration, see Bainton, Temporary Restraining Orders and Preliminary
Injunctions: It's Largely in the Lawyering, in R. SUGARMAN, LITIGATING COPYRIGHT, TRADEMARK,
AND UNFAIR COMPETITION CASES, 1 11-130 (1982).
159. 28 U.S.C. § 1291 (1982).
160. 28 U.S.C. § 1292(a)(1) (1982).
161. Id.
162. Ettelson v. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co., 317 U.S. 188 (1942).
163. 7 MOORE'S FEDERAL PRACTICE § 65.07 (1983-84).
164. Sampson v. Murray, 415 U.S. 61, 86-88 (1974); Telex Corp. v. International Business
Machines Corp., 464 F.2d 1025 (8th Cir. 1972); Sims v. Greene, 160 F.2d 512 (3d Cir. 1947).
165. Fernandez-Roque v. Smith, 671 F.2d 426, 427-30 (1 1th Cir. 1982).
166. Id. at 430.
167. American Motors Corp. v. F.T.C., 601 F.2d 1329, 1331-2 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 444
U.S. 941 (1979).
168. 601 F.2d at 1331.
169. 606 F.2d I (2d Cir. 1979).
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straining order. The movant has the burden to show by clear and convinc-
ing evidence that the alleged action is in violation of the order.' 70 Once
contempt is proven, the court is obligated to restore the plaintiff to the posi-
tion it would have held had the injunction been obeyed. 17 1 The court can
impose civil or criminal penalties. 172 Recently, a federal court broke new
ground when it authorized a private attorney to conduct an "Abscam" type
undercover operation. The judge appointed two of plaintiff's attorneys as
special federal prosecutors. After the undercover investigation, the judge is-
sued the defendants show-cause orders for criminal contempt.17
3
III. TYPES OF Ex PARTE TEMPORARY RELIEF AVAILABLE
Ex parte relief takes various forms such as injunctive, seizure, and im-
pounding. This section will discuss each of these forms.
A. Ex Parle Injunctions
Perhaps the most common form of temporary relief is injunction. In-
deed, Rule 65 is entitled "injunctions." For trademark infringement, injunc-
tions usually prevent wrongdoers from using the infringing mark, trade
dress, or counterfeit goods. In copyright cases, injunctions may enjoin in-
fringing works, the performance of the infringing work (such as playing a
video game), or the continued use of the infringing material (such as com-
puter software). In trade secret cases, injunctions prevent any disclosure of
the alleged trade secrets by the wrongdoer. In patent cases, injunctions pre-
vent further infringement of the patent by enjoining manufacture, use, or
sale of the invention. Injunctions can be limited geographically, by time, by
specific goods, by specific persons, or by any other device to precisely define
the extent of relief.'
74
170. Hart, Schaffner & Marx v. Alexander's Department Stores, Inc., 341 F.2d 101, 102 (2d
Cir. 1965).
171. Vuitton & Fils S.A. v. Carousel Handbags, 592 F.2d at 130.
172. For criminal contempt, see, Smotherman v. United States, 186 F.2d 676 (10th Cir.
1950).
173. Natl' L.J., May 21, 1984, at 3, 44.
174. An example of a trademark clause in a temporary restraining order enjoining trade-
mark infringement is:
Defendants, their agents, servants, employees, attorneys, officers and those persons in
active concert or participation with them [enjoined] from using in any unauthorized
manner the name CALVIN KLEIN or any terms confusingly similar thereto, in con-
nection with the buying, offering for sale, selling or holding for sale, tops, jeans or
other merchandise, or buying or selling any related goods or of any merchandise bear-
ing unauthorized or counterfeit labels, printings or hang tags bearing the name CAL-
VIN KLEIN; and from unfairly competing with plaintiffs in connection with the use
of the name CALVIN KLEIN, or otherwise unfairly competing with Plaintiffs, or in
connection with the use of the name CALVIN KLEIN otherwise interfering with
plaintiffs' businesses.
Calvin Klein Co. v. Fillipe Menswear, No. 82 Cn. 6060 (S.D. Fla. Feb. 2, 1982).
Ex parte seizure orders may be enforced by the courts, or infrequently, by private parties.
The Lanham Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1118 (1982), specifically authorizes a U.S. District Court to order
the U.S. Marshal's Office to seize and impound all infringing merchandise as well as all other
infringing material in the alleged infringers possession, custody or control:
In any action arising under this chapter, in which a violation of any right of the regis-
trant of a mark registered in the Patent and Trademark Office shall have been estab-
lished, the court may order that all labels, signs, prints, packages, wrappers,
DENVER LAW JOURNAL
B. Ex Parte Seizure
Authority for issuing seizure orders on an ex parte and temporary basis
is found in Rule 64 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure with provides for:
"Seizure of personal property for the purpose of securing satisfaction of the
judgment ultimately to be entered in the action." The Rule further pro-
vides: "Arrest, attachment, garnishment, replevin, sequestration and other
. . . equivalent remedies [are available] at the commencement of and during
the course of an action . . . under the circumstances and in the manner
provided by the law of the state in which the district court is held."' 175 It is
interesting that with respect to this rule, the peculiar law of each state must
be adhered to. In any event, courts use seizure orders in both trademark
(especially against counterfeiters) and copyright cases even though the power
to issue the orders is based upon separate federal statutes.
Ex parte relief has been used by state courts to quell unfair trade prac-
tices since the turn of the century. For example, in 1911 the Colorado
Supreme Court endorsed the use of ex parte relief to prevent railroad ticket
scalpers from continuing their unauthorized business. 176 In language re-
markably similar to that used in Vuitton et Fils SA.,' 77 the Colorado court
recognized that irreparable injury would result from ticket scalping, and
that the great delay required to notify sixty five defendants throughout the
state would permit them to, "as has been done under similar circumstances
in like cases, assign their business to others, not parties to the suit, and would
dispose of the tickets acquired by them to third persons, many of them be-
yond the jurisdiction of the court."
178
Counterfeiters display an adroitness once reserved to the drug trade and
make their operations covert. They typically use cash exclusively, maintain
few records, conceal counterfeit merchandise, and conceal their identities
from buyers. Although trademark owners could use ex parte temporary re-
straining orders to enjoin the sale of counterfeit merchandise, these surrepti-
tious methods used by counterfeiters still prevent trademark owners from
estimating damages. 
179
receptacles, and advertisements in the possession of the defendant, bearing the regis-
tered mark or any reproduction, counterfeit, copy, or colorable imitation thereof, and
all plates, molds, matrices, and other means of making the same, shall be delivered up
and destroyed.
15 U.S.L. § 1118 (1982).
Some "novel" ex parte seizure orders have permitted the use of private investigators or
attorneys rather than U.S. Marshalls, to conduct the search and seizure. See Bainton, supra note
3, at 462-63; Johnson, supra note 4; and Appleson, "John Doe TROs" Stem Illegal T-Shirt Sales, 68
A.B.A.J. 30 (1982).
175. FED. R. Civ. P. 64.
176. Kirby v. Union Pacific R.R. Co., 51 Colo. 509, 119 P. 1042 (1911); Kirby v. Colorado
& Southern R.R. Co., 51 Colo. 545, 119 P. 1056 (1911).
177. 606 F.2d I (2d Cir. 1979).
178. Kirby v. Union Pacific R.R. Co., 51 Colo. 509, 544, 119 P. 1042, 1055 (1911).
179. Bainton has stated:
[O]nce a counterfeiter is caught and sued, a trademark owner cannot prove the vol-
ume of the counterfeiter's undocumented cash sales and, therefore, has no realistic
hope of recovering the counterfeiter's profits in civil litigation.
Bainton, supra note 3, at 462. See Vuitton et Fils, S.A. v. Crown Handbags, 492 F. Supp. 1071
(S.D.N.Y. 1979), aj'd, 622 F.2d 577 (2d Cir. 1980), in which the trademark owner collected
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In response to Vuitton, federal courts began issuing ex parte temporary
restraining orders supplemented by seizure orders, which permit trademark
owners to seize infringing merchandise and business records to assess the in-
jury suffered from counterfeit sales. Business records are also helpful in dis-
covering the counterfeit "pipeline" through which the merchandise has
traveled. Although the Lanham Act does not authorize the seizure of busi-
ness records, most federal courts now routinely issue such orders. 180
Two commentators suggest that the legal basis for court orders permit-
ting trademark owners to seize business records may be the little-known All
Writs Act,1 8 ' which confers broad power to the federal courts to issue any
order considered "necessary or appropriate in aid of their respective
jurisdictions."
' 182
Numerous district courts have issued ex parte seizure orders in trade-
mark counterfeiting cases. 183 Ex parte seizure and impoundment orders in
copyright cases are also frequently granted. 184 The United States Supreme
Court has specifically provided rules for the ex parte seizure of allegedly
infringing copyrighted works and related materials. 18 5 These rules allow the
impoundment of goods and insure the eventual destruction of the infringing
articles. Defendants have attacked these copyright rules using constitutional
arguments under the first, fourth, and fifth amendments. All such attacks,
however, have not prevailed. 18 6 Plaintiff must file and sign an affidavit of
damages from the sale of no more than six counterfeit articles because no other counterfeit
merchandise could be found at defendant's premises.
180. See, e.g., Fimab-Finanziaria Maglifico, Etc. v. Kitchen, 548 F. Supp., 248 (S.D. Fla.
1982). See Bainton, supra note 3 at 463 & n. 11; Katz and Cohen, Obtaining Ex Parte Injunctions and
Impoundment Orders, MERCHANDISE REP. 6, 8 n.12 (November 1983) (numerous citations).
181. 28 U.S.C. § 1651. See Bainton, supra note 3; Katz and Cohen, supra note 97 at 10.
182. Id.; see Bainton, supra n.3, at 465. In United States v. New York Telephone Co., 434
U.S. 159, 172 (1977), the court interpreted the inherent powers in the act:
This statute has served since its inclusion, in substance, in the original Judiciary Act as
a legislative approved source of procedural instruments designed to achieve the ra-
tional ends of law. . . . Unless appropriately confined by Congress, a federal court
may avail itself of all auxiliary writs as aids in the performance of its duties, when the
use of such historic aids is calculated in its sound judgment to achieve the ends of
justice entrusted to it. The power conferred by the Act extends, under appropriate
circumstances, to persons who, though not parties to the original action or engaged in
wrongdoing, are in a position to frustrate the implementation of a court order or the
proper administration ofjustice. . .and encompasses even those who have not taken
an affirmative action to hinder justice. (citations omitted).
AccordBally Midway Mfg. Co. v. Paul Mazzilli 82 C. 2490, (E.D.N.Y. April 3, 1983), as reported
in Katz and Cohen, supra note 165, at 8.
183. See Bainton, supra note 3 at 463, n. 11; Katz and Cohen, supra note 97 at 6. Vuitton et
Fils S.A. v. Crown Handbags, 492 F. Supp. 1071 (S.D.N.Y. 1979) affd 622 F.2d 577 (2d Cir.
1980) explicitly recommended that such orders should be narrow in scope. But see NFL Proper-
ties, Inc. v. Coniglio, 554 F. Supp. 1224 (D.D.C. 1983), which allows plaintiffis request to take a
shotgun approach.
184. Under 17 U.S.C. § 503(a) (1982):
At any time while an action under this title is pending, the court may order the im-
pounding, on such terms as it may deem reasonable, of all copies or phonorecords
claimed to have been made or used in violation of the copyright owner's exclusive
rights, and of all plates, molds, matrices, masters, tapes, film negatives, or other articles
by means of which such copies or phonorecords may be reproduced.
185. The Rules of Practice for Copyright Cases 3-11 (Annots. of 17 U.S.C.A. § 501).
186. See, e.g., Bally Midway Mfg. Co., v. Paul Mazzilli, 82 C. 2490, slip op. (E.D.N.Y. April
6, 1983); Universal City Studios, Inc. v. Film Ventures Int'l, Inc., 543 F. Supp. 1134, 1142
(C.D.Calif. 1982). Cassidy v. Bowlin, 540 F. Supp. 901, 905 (W.D.Mo. 1982); Stern Electronics
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"value and location" of the infringing articles and must file a bond for at
least twice the value of the infringing material.
18 7
The ex parte temporary restraining order, when combined with the
seizure order, is a formidable weapon against trademark and copyright
counterfeiting. It is also a drastic remedy which deserves stringent safe-
guards. The ex parte seizure order permits trademark, copyright, and trade
secret owners to conduct unannounced searches and to impound whatever
they find that may bear on the infringement. Unlike the Anton Piller orders
of the English Commonwealth, in which the defendant may refuse to permit
the search at the risk of suffering adverse evidentiary presumptions, the
American seizure order is mandatory; courts may enforce them with their
criminal contempt power.' 8 8 In certain circumstances, the order will direct
the United States Marshal to use reasonable force as the circumstances war-
rant to gain entrance to defendant's premises in order to seize and impound
the infringing articles. 19
In Calvin Klein Company and Centerfold Industries, Inc. v. Filippe Mens
Wear,'90 the court, in part, ordered:
That the U.S. Marshal seize and impound, before 3:00 P.M. this
day, all labels, signs, prints, packages, wrappers, receptacles, ap-
parel and advertisements at Defendants' place of business [precise
address set forth] and in the possession of defendants bearing the
name CALVIN KLEIN, or duplications of other of Plaintiffs indi-
cia; and all plates, molds, matrices and other means of making the
same; and all business records, checkbooks, check registers and the
like relating to the foregoing; and allow Plaintiffs' attorneys to im-
mediately inspect and copy same, but Plaintiffs are to return all
records by Noon of the following day and take possession of only
one sample of each type of garment seized herein.
This order contains important restrictions: 1) only the U.S. Marshal is per-
mitted to seize and impound suspected goods and 2) the plaintiff must re-
turn confiscated business records by noon of the following day. Therefore,
plaintiff's attorney must be prepared to rapidly copy a large number of
records in little time.
Inc. v. Amusement Consultants, Inc., No. 81-2581 (E.D.N.Y. Aug. 10, 1981); DollCraft Indus-
tries Ltd v. Well-Made Toy Mfg. Co., 479 F. Supp. 1105, 1118 (E.D.N.Y. 1978); Dealer Adver-
tising v. Barbara Allen Financial Advertising, Inc., 197 U.S.P.Q. 611, 614 (W.D.Mich. 1977);
Universal Film Mfg. Co. v. Cooperman, 206 F. 69, 70 (S.D.N.Y. 1913).
187. The Rules of Practice for Copyright Cases 3-13 (Annots. of 17 U.S.C.A. § 501). See,
e.g., Piaget Watch Corp. v. International Confirmers & Financiers, Inc., No. 83-2058, (S.D. Fla.,
Aug. 15, 1983). Where the order read: "Failure to comply with this order may result in a
finding of criminal contempt and penalty of jail."
188. While the orders are mandatory, as pointed out by Katz and Cohen, supra, note 165 at
page 10, in Bally Midway Mfg. Co. v. Mischok Toy Co., 82 C 2490, slip op., (E.D.N.Y. April 3,
1983) the defendant's counsel successfully prevented the entry of the police officers serving the
ex parte order because the seizure bond was not attached to the papers. As in Skip v. Harwood,
3 Atk. 564 (1747), the defendants then removed business records during the night, destroyed
infringing evidence, and minimized the available evidence.
189. One commentator has indicated that it is impossible to obtain such an order in certain
jurisdictions. Bainton, Temporary Restraining Orders and Prehminay Injunctions.- It's Largely in the
Lawyering, in LITIGATING COPYRIGHT, TRADEMARK AND UNFAIR COMPETITION CASES, 77, 84
(R. Sugarman, ed., 1982).
190. No. 828-6060-Civ.-JAG (S.D. Fla. Feb. 2, 1982).
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Later that year, the same court lifted both the restrictions and the stipu-
lation that counterfeit goods must be seized at a specific location:
1. That the U.S. Marshal for this district, and persons acting
under his supervision or persons acting under the supervision
of plaintiffs' attorneys, shall at any time from September 22,
1982 at 12:30 P.M. through September 23, 1982 at 6:00 P.M.
at or in the vicinity of 115 South Miami Avenue, Miami, Flor-
ida, or anywhere in the State of Florida, seize and impound
any and all infringing and counterfeit watches bearing the
mark CARTIER in the aforesaid defendants' possession or
control including any cartons or containers in which the said
watches are packaged, and deliver up same to the care and
custody of this Court or to plaintiffs' attorneys pending the fur-
ther order of this Court; and it is further ordered, that the U.S.
Marshal or persons acting under plaintiffs' attorneys' supervi-
sion, be directed to seize any documents relating in any man-
ner to the purchase, offering for sale or sale of counterfeit
CARTIER watches by the aforesaid defendants, and allow
plaintiffs or their attorneys to inspect and copy same
immediately. 191
There is no denying entry to plaintiffs and their use of photographers,
copying machines, and U.S. Marshals. In this respect, the ex parte seizure
order is fundamentally a civil search warrant. Substantial injury to business
and to reputation is likely to result from such intrusions and, therefore, the
courts must be vigilant to protect the defendant from the excesses of errant
plaintiffs but equally vigilant in protecting the plaintiff's constitutional and
statutory rights.
C. Ex Parte Inspections
Akin to seizing the infringing goods and business records is the order
permitting the plaintiff or its representative to enter the defendant's premises
to inspect documents relating to the infringing activities, to inspect the arti-
cles for purposes of identification, and to inspect other information pertain-
ing to the alleged wrongdoing. For example, the court may authorize a
person with suitable "technical qualifications" to inspect these documents,
articles, and information. This approach merits further consideration as it
appears to protect the rights of the defendant. Examples of typical inspec-
tion language follow:
Plaintiff may enter upon the business premises of defendants, in the
company of the U.S. Marshal, or other suitable individuals for the
sole purpose of photographing and inventoring (sic) the quantity of
counterfeit chemist's solvent upon the premises of the defendants,
and that the plaintiff will report and make available all the infor-
mation gathered to the court at the hearing on the Motion for Pre-
liminary Injunction. 1
92
191. Cartier Inc. v. Lottie's Jewelry, Inc., No. 82-0666-Civ.-WMH (S.D. Fla. Sept. 22,
1982).




D. Ex Parte Seahng of File
In view of frequent roving news reporters at federal court houses, many
movants for ex parte relief now consider sealing the file pending service of
the complaint, service of the order and a hearing on the preliminary injunc-
tion both to prevent the nonmovant from informing other wrongdoers or
members of the public about movant's enforcement action and to prevent
unnecessary and perhaps improper publicity concerning the defendant from
occurring. 19 3 In the latter case, such action by the movant may well prevent
a counterclaim of libel, slander or disparagement.
F. Ex Parte Acceleration of Discovey
Because of the propensity of defendants in counterfeit situations to leave
the jurisdiction of the court, because of their tendency to remove evidence,
and because of the other urgent necessities of these types of cases, it may
become imperative to accelerate discovery under Rule 26(b) of the Federal
Rules of Civil Procedure. For example, in Cartier, Inc. v. Lotties Jewelry,
Inc.,' 94 the district court looked at the tendency of defendants in similar
counterfeiting cases to remove or destroy evidence and granted accelerated
discovery along with a temporary restraining order and seizure. 195 The ac-
celeration of discovery may include an accelerated answer from the defend-
ant, and the court may set specific standards for the service of process.1
9 6
CONCLUSION
The current situation between intellectual property owners and infring-
ers is anything but fair. Undeniably, the infringer has the upper hand and
the trademark owner needs extraordinary measures to protect his property
rights. One commentator at the turn of the century wrote that "It has been
observed that 'the modern uses of the writ [i.e., ex parte temporary injunc-
tions] bear no more resemblance to its ancient uses than the milky way bears
193. Cartier Inc. v. Lottie's Jewelry, Inc., No. 82-0666-Civ.-WMH (S.D. Fla. Sept. 22, 1982)
provides an example of such an order:
Plaintiffs' Motion for Order Temporarily Sealing the File is granted. The Clerk shall
seal the file until plaintiffs' attorneys notify the clerk that the file may be re-opened.
194. No. 82-0666-Civ.-WMH (S.D. Fla. Sept. 22, 1982).
195. The order for accelerated discovery read:
Plaintiffs' Motion for Expedited Discovery is granted. The aforesaid individual de-
fendant and representatives of the aforesaid corporate defendant are instructed to ap-
pear for depositions at the office of plaintiffs' counsel on September 30, 1982 at 9:00
A.M. Each defendant or representative of a corporate defendant is instructed to bring
to the deposition all documents, invoices, correspondence, or other materials referring
or relating in any way to the manufacture, sale, advertisement, or distribution of
watches or other items of jewelry bearing the mark CARTIER or "intertwined C".
Id. at 4-5.
196. The Cartier order gave defendants six days to answer:
FURTHER ORDERED that personal service on the aforesaid defendants shall be
made at the time of seizure by the U.S. Marshall, plaintiffs' attorneys and/or their
authorized representatives, and that such service shall be deemed sufficient. Copies of
all the other previously-served pleadings shall be made available to defendants or their
counsel upon request. Answering papers, if any, are to be served upon the attorneys
for plaintiffs on or before 5 P.M. September 28, 1982, and that they be ready without




to the sun.' ",197 In contrast, this brief historical review of the more impor-
tant developments in ex parte relief provide a firm basis for understanding
and properly using the modern law. From the viewpoint of honest business
practices, there is little difference between cutting down a dam, as in Perry v.
Parker,198 and the intentional disclosure of a company's valuable trade
secrets to competitors. The anti-competitive harm is the same, the injury is
just as irreparable, and the response of the court must be swift and ex parte.
Pirates, infringers, and unfair competitors fully appreciate the limitations of
the law, and if the courts do not respond with ex parte orders, then truly
"serious mischief" will occur, just as it did in 1747 in Skip v. Harwood.'99
Two hundred fifty years after Skip v. Harwood,2° ° courts and plaintiffs
must continue to deal with defendants who use delay to frustrate any chance
for relief. Serious mischief has in fact provided impetus for the current revi-
val of ex parte temporary relief in the federal courts. After years of ineffec-
tual efforts, plaintiffs realize that ex parte orders are essential to policing
property rights and preventing some unscrupulous parties from using the
delay of notice to their own advantage. In intellectual property disputes, for
example, counterfeiters and infringers often use the delay between notice
and hearing, just as Harwood did, to conceal their inventories, which will
eventually reappear and plague the rightful owner. The development of ex
parte orders to prevent serious mischief was a response to situations similar
to those in Skip v. Harwood,20 1 in which the right to notice has been subverted
to serve illegal purposes.
Ex parte relief in the United States has had a roller coaster history. In
the early 1800's, federal courts were simply not authorized to grant ex parte
relief in any case. This federal statute was repealed and, by the turn of the
century, ex parte relief was commonly used, if not fully abused, in handling
labor strikes. With the advent of procedural due process arguments, ex parte
relief became so rare in many federal district courts that even today many
such courts simply refuse to grant ex parte relief.
This article has set forth the entirely necessary procedural guidelines for
ex parte relief clearly indicated by historical precedence. Ex parte relief
often provides the only viable legal remedy to owners of intellectual property
against pirates, counterfeiters, and smugglers. If uniform application of ex
parte relief does not occur, such wrongdoers will quickly profit and capitalize
on this type of legal confusion.
It is clear that this problem is not confined to the territorial limits of the
United States of America, but finds application, upon similar just grounds,
in England and its former colonies. 20 2 Hopefully, the present prevalent use
of ex parte relief in counterfeiting cases will not be overused and cause a
cyclical return to an era of non-use, as was the case after the use of ex parte
orders to quell labor strikes. Rather, the courts should view ex parte tempo-
197. Whitelock, supra n.1.
198. 19 F.Cas. 291 (C.C.D.Mass. 1846) (No. 11, 010).
199. 3 Atk. 564, 26 Eng. Rep. 1125 (1747).
200. Id
201. Id
202. See Bigger, ,otes From Other Nations, 71 TRADEMARK REP. 257, 259-60 (198 1).
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rary relief according to well established judicial principles, discussed above,
and grant or deny such requests based on these principles as they have dis-
pensed with justice under other legal principles.
